New clues reveal the demise of MH370. Since the crash of MH370 in the Indian Ocean a considerable amount of physical evidence has been gathered. 43 pieces of floating debris have been found and 41 delivered to the Malaysian authorities for investigation. Two items are awaiting repatriation to Malaysia and are still in the BEA offices in Madagascar. Official reports are still awaited for 10 items. 19 items of floating debris probably originating from MH370 have been found washed ashore in Madagascar, which is situated in the Indian Ocean at the latitudes where the South Equatorial Current interacts with the island.
Another item of floating debris known as the “Tataly” debris item has been discovered in a fisherman’s back yard which was found washed ashore on the Antsiraka Peninsula South Beach in Madagascar in March 2017 after the tropical storm Fernando had passed by. The debris item had barnacles on it when it was found. 4 items of MH370 debris have been found on the same beach including an item known as the “Broken O” debris item. The location was predicted by the University of Western Australia (UWA) oceanographic model. The “Broken O” debris item is possibly from the tail of MH370 and part of the vertical stabiliser near the rudder hinges such as here
The “Tataly” debris item was originally thought to be likely the remnant of the left main landing gear trunnion door, but in a more recent analysis has been shown to be more likely a remnant of a flap or slat such as here
Both the debris items are almost certain to be from MH370 and are similar to other items of floating debris found in the Western Indian Ocean and subsequently shown to be from a Boeing 777 or more specifically from the Boeing 777-200ER aircraft with the registration 9M-MRO used for the flight number MH370. There is a common construction, consistent use of lightning strike protection and the items were found in the same location as predicted by the drift analysis.
The debris item was torn from its fixings and has suffered considerable damage. The possibility that there is an indent typical of the base plate of an attachment or drive rod indicates that the debris item is likely part of a movable panel. The slicing damage to the debris item penetrates right through the item and is the result of a significant force. Whatever the cause of the slicing damage, the fact that the damage was from the interior side to the exterior side of the debris item leads to the conclusion that the item was likely in close proximity to the engines and the damage was possibly caused by fan blades slicing through the flap or slat.
The level of damage with fractures on all sides and the extreme force of the penetration right through the debris item lead to the conclusion that the end of the flight was in a high speed dive designed to ensure the aircraft broke up into as many pieces as possible. The crash of MH370 was anything but a soft landing on the ocean. Expert analysis showed that the flaps were not partially extended as would be the case for a sea ditching.
The combination of high speed impact and possible extension of the landing gear show a clear intent to hide the evidence of the crash. The recovered MH370 floating debris speaks to how the plane crashed, and the oceanographic drift analysis speaks to where. Neither can tell us who was flying the aircraft or why. It is hoped that the debris item will undergo a professional examination and analysis leading to an identification and provenance of the item.
A full report by Blaine Gibson and Richard Godfrey can be downloaded at the following link (35 pages, 100 MB): here
21st December 2022 – A major update to the report answering the many questions we have received, with the use of high resolution photos, can be downloaded at the following link (14 pages, 113 MB): here
7th December 2023 – A second major update to the report answering the many questions we have received about the lightning strike protection, with the help of an aviation expert familiar with the Boeing 777, can be downloaded at the following link (17 pages, 36 MB): here
@All,
In our recent update to our paper on the floating debris we state: “Apart from the test by BEA in France on the Aluminium Substrate of the flaperon, there were no specific tests of the LSP on floating debris items either by the ATSB in Australia or by the MOT in Malaysia.”
Mick Gilbert, who obviously has not read our paper or updates, nevertheless tries to criticise our work in saying we cannot differentiate between up and down or exterior and interior of a remnant of a wing or rudder part from MH370.
BEA shows in their analysis of the MH370 flaperon, that there is:
(1) A surface treatment for lightning strike protection (please see Figure 13 in our recent update).
(2) A conductive aluminium substrate (an underlying layer) for lightning strike protection (please see Figure 13 in our recent update).
(3) A conductive wire mesh layer for lightning strike protection (please see Figure 12 in our recent update).
Lightning strike protection includes surface treatments, conductive substrates and conductive wire mesh layers. These are up and down, exterior and interior, surface and embedded. To quote an article saying “up”, in order to disprove “down”, or “exterior” to disprove “interior” or “surface” to disprove “embedded” is twisted nonsense and polemic. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
At least Mick Gilbert has withdrawn his statements about the use of resin, when confronted with the expert facts about the use of resins in aircraft manufacture. “The metal mesh needs resin, adhesive or surface film to remain attached to the composite substructure.”
At least Mick Gilbert has withdrawn his statements about the use of “resin/media flow mesh”, when confronted with the expert facts. “Resin flow mesh is usually made of high-density polyethylene (HDPE), which is non-conductive and is not to be confused with Dexmet Corporation MicroGrid® precision expanded metal foils or Gill Corporation StrikeGrid® products, which are highly conductive.”
The eight other items of floating debris shown in our latest update all reveal a conductive wire mesh layer. Since the ATSB or the MOT did not conduct a detailed analysis of the surface or substrates with an electron microscope like BEA, we do not have the evidence from the surface or substrate of the other eight items. We simply do not know, but for Mick Gilbert to claim that absence of evidence is actually evidence of absence is illogical, misleading and false. Next Mick Gilbert will be telling us that he grabbed his electron microscope and ran down to the ATSB to take a few pictures.
Our conclusion remains the same despite all this arm waving from Mick Gilbert on the arm chair arm waving specialist’s website run by Victor Iannello.
Both the “Tataly” and “Broken O” debris items are from MH370, since MH370 is the only Boeing 777 aircraft to have crashed in the Indian Ocean and there is a striking commonality not only from the match to the drift analysis in both time and location, but also from the lightning strike prevention (LSP) evidence.
Hi Richard I truly applaud your efforts and your continueas work to identify and find any items relating to MH370, I’m sorry this fued with Victor is still happening, all I can say is do what your own heart tells you and do everything you can within your knowledge and power to help finally put this event to rest.
Richard is there plans for a search soon?
@Harry,
Welcome to the blog!
There has been no update on a new underwater search for MH370 since 27th September 2023, where Ocean Infinity confirmed that they are: “still keen to get back out there for another search.”
@MikeR,
Many thanks for the kind words!
It would be nice to be able to express an opinion on the search for MH370 without someone on Victor Iannello’s website telling you that you are “false”, “bizarre”, “sick”, “dishonest”, “untruthful”, “doubtful”, “bogus”, “obsessive”, “unhinged” or “consciously fraudulent”.
Victor Iannello et al obviously can’t cope with anyone having a different opinion to them or disagreeing with what they say. The sustained and bitter railing and condemnation of any opinion we express is not what I expect from civilised and educated people.
@Richard Godfrey
As a layperson, I am very interested in your work on MH370.
Do you have any news from Ocean Infinity when the search will start? At the moment we hear less.
I would also be interested to know whether the black box still works despite a crash after almost 10 years under water or whether the cause of the crash can still be found out.
Thank you very much and all the best.
@Elias,
Welcome to the blog!
I sent Ocean Infinity a draft of our new paper on WSPR as Radar on 5th December 2023, for which they thanked me and said they will have a read. There has been no update on a new underwater search for MH370 since 27th September 2023, where Ocean Infinity confirmed that they are: “still keen to get back out there for another search.”
The Flight Data Recorder is designed to withstand a crash. As long as the physical structure of the box is not compromised the data will still be retrievable after 10 years. The data is held in non-volatile memory that does not require any electrical power.
Finding the main wreckage is very important as it will give a lot more information about what happened and hopefully enable the experts to solve the mystery of MH370’s disappearance.
I completely agree with Mr. Larry Vance that MH370 WAS NOT a high speed dive, like Swissair 111 (in which Mr.Vance was the leader of the investigation team) or Air France 447. In both cases the planes were broken into millions of pieces and many of them remain floating in the ocean. That was NOT the case for MH370. If the intention of the pilot was to hide the plane he must try to keep in one piece as much as he could. That would be only possible with a slow ditch into the ocean. Also according to Mr. Vance, the flaperon founded in Reunion Island had signals to be DOWN.
@Nestor Rodriguez,
Welcome to the blog!
We have already discussed the Vance theory in 55 comments on this blog.
The Vance theory has long since been debunked!
Hi Richard – thanks very much for your excellent analysis. I have a question for you about the first SDU reboot at 18.25 UTC, which many people find puzzling, and I would be very interested in your take.
It’s clear the SDU was isolated from power for a period of time after the aircraft deviated from its scheduled flight path, for at least 48 minutes but likely a bit longer. And then power was reinstated, triggering the logon request.
My understanding of the situation is as follows:
– it would not be necessary to cut power to the SDU to make it go silent, if that was the objective. That could be accomplished by other simpler means from the flight deck.
– it is possible to cut power to the SDU from the flight deck by tripping the left electrical power bus, which provides power to the SDU plus a number of other non critical aircraft systems (such as the CVR and the in flight entertainment system, including passenger satellite phones)
So my question is why power was cut and then reinstated to the SDU, when that was not necessary to prevent communications from the SDU. Could it be that the actual objective was to disable other systems on the same electrical bus? Clearly there could be a motive to disable the IFE system and passenger satellite phones. But cutting power to the CVR would preserve the recording of the critical part of the flight, which would otherwise be overwritten every two hours. Could that be why power was subsequently reinstated?
Incidentally on the question of end of flight scenario, I don’t understand why this is still a point of controversy, as in some of the comments. The Doppler signature of final satellite handshake shows a downward acceleration of 0.68g. Add this to the known non deployment of the high lift devices, and it should not really be a point of discussion any more.
Thanks, Mike
@Mike N,
Welcome to the blog and many thanks for the kind words!
You ask: “Could it be that the actual objective was to disable other systems on the same electrical bus?”
The Satellite Communication System (SATCOM) is powered by the 115V AC Left Secondary 2 Bus. The Voice Recorder System (VOX RCDR) is powered by the 115V AC L Transfer Bus and to erase it you need 2 hours of silence in the cockpit. The Onboard Local Area Network (OLAN) is powered by the 115V AC Left Bus Main.
It is clear that the active pilot did not want any communication to the outside world or any recording from the cockpit.
The flight was very carefully planned using waypoints, but never joining flight routes. The active pilot did not want his final route to be detected by radar or by other aircraft. The active pilot also wanted to avoid any collision or close miss with any other aircraft.
In my view, another reason for the power up and logon sequence of the SATCOM between 18:25:27.421 UTC and 18:28:14.904 UTC is that it is powered by the same bus as the Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) namely the 115V AC Left Secondary 2 Bus.
Once out of Malaysian radar range and also out of Malaysian ADS-B receiver range, it would be possible to briefly switch back on the TCAS. In order to function correctly the TCAS requires working interfaces with:
– Left and right airplane information management system (AIMS) cabinets
– Left and right ATC/Mode S transponders (XPDR)
– Left and right warning electronic units (WEUs)
– Left and right radio altimeters (RAS)
– Ground proximity warning computer (GPWC)
– Left and right weather radar receiver-transmitters (WXR)
– Left and right proximity switch electronic units (PSEUs)
The active pilot would be able to see if there was any other traffic in the vicinity and also check if there is any bad weather on the intended flight path.
The downside is that as soon as you switch back on the XPDR, you give away your position to any other aircraft within range.
In my view, the TCAS was briefly in operation when crossing other flight routes and one reason for not flying a straight line route southwards into the Indian Ocean for 6 hours is, that if detected by another aircraft, MH370 would always be on a different track. In this way, if there was a detection of MH370 and a report to ATC, it would be confusing as to the final destination of MH370.
The TCAS surveillance area is up to 30 nmi in front of the aircraft and slightly less to the side or behind the aircraft and up to 10,000 feet above and below the aircraft, The WXR can detect turbulence up to 40 nmi and weather up to 320 nmi in front of the aircraft. The cockpit map displays can be set to a range of 10, 20, 40, 80, 160, 320 or 640 nmi.
Regarding your second question of the end of flight scenario, it is true that the BFO shows an accelerating dive of around 14,500 fpm at 0.68g, but the Boeing end of flight simulations show it is possible to recover from such a dive. The ATSB analysis concluded that the flaps were not extended, so a controlled soft ditching did not happen, but that is an entirely separate issue as to whether MH370 crashed close to the 7th Arc or at a distance of 50 nmi or 60 nmi from the 7th Arc. There are 4 intersecting anomalous WSPRnet links at 29.128°S 99.934°E, which is around 48 nmi from the 7th Arc and this is where I believe MH370 crashed.
Thanks so much for the response Richard. A lot to unpack there. I totally agree that whoever was in control of the aircraft did whatever they could to avoid any outgoing communications.
I’m still somewhat puzzled by the SATCOM power up at 18.25 UTC. Am I right in thinking that with power reinstated to the SDU, ACARS messages would automatically be restarted at regular intervals? Unless of course that system had been disabled from EE bay? So possibly, cutting power to the SDU was an interim solution until it was possible to exit the flight deck and get into the EE bay? And then once that was done, the SDU was powered up again because the pilot needed associated systems?
And sorry to bug you but a question on WSPR. To what extent has this technology been validated against known flight paths? Including the known section of the MH370 flight path.
@Mike N,
ACARS messages are automatically restarted at 30 minute intervals when the SATCOM system is powered up, unless the ACARS system via both SATCOM and VHF has been disabled. The ACARS system and the SATCOM are two separate systems. The ACARS system can also use the VHF system instead of the SATCOM to communicate.
The ACARS system is part of the Data Communication Management System (DCMS), which is part of the Aircraft Information Managements System (AIMS). Although the AIMS is housed in the Main Equipment Centre (MEC), there are circuit breakers in the cockpit overhead panel, so there is no need to enter the MEC (EE bay).
The Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) datalink sub-function manages flight plan and maintenance data between the airplane and the ground service provider (GSP).
The Central Maintenance Computing System (CMCS) Airline Modifiable Information (AMI) supplies the airplane tail identification to the DCMS. The DCMS ACARS sub-function must have this information to operate.
The ACARS datalink sub-function connects to these components of other systems:
– Satellite data unit (SDU)
– Centre and right Very High Frequency Communication System transceivers (VHF)
– Left, center and right radio tuning panels (RTPs)
The centre VHF exchanges data with the ACARS modem in the left CPM/Comm. The right VHF exchanges data with the ACARS modem in the right CPM/Comm. The DCMS does not interface with the left VHF transceiver.
Page one of the ACARS sub-menu lets the flight crew select the ACARS frequency and scan rate.
Page two of the ACARS sub-menu lets the flight crew select the ACARS mode of transmission. The selections are:
– AUTO
– SATCOM mode only
– VHF mode only
Page two of the ACARS sub-menu also shows ACARS status messages. The possible ACARS messages are:
– NO ACARS LINK
- ACARS SATCOM MODE
– ACARS LINK ESTABLISHED
– ACARS VHF MODE
The flight crew sets the datalink path through the MANAGER menu of the AIMS flight deck communications function (FDCF). The path preferences are:
– VHF
– SATCOM
– Auto
The power-up default selection is auto. When the auto path is set, the ACARS sub-function uses a preference table for internal downlink routing to select a communications transceiver.
The last ACARS message from MH370 was at 17:07:29 UTC. Thereafter all attempts to send an ACARS message, received the response that the aircraft was not logged on to ACARS.
At no time did the ACARS system send a message “ACARS INOP” or “ACARS COMM FAIL”.
WSPR has been validated against over 50 flights, including MH370 and other flights with the same aircraft 9M-MRO. Prof. Simon Maskell is currently validating WSPR against around 1,000 Boeing 777 flights.
I see. So there has been misinformation in the press where it’s been stated a number of times that ACARS can only be disabled from the EE bay.
If I understand you correctly then, all the aircraft communication systems can be disabled individually from the cockpit. Why then would the pilot feel it necessary to cut power to the SATCOM unit? Especially since doing so disabled some other systems that the pilot actually needed, as evidenced by power being reinstated in the order of an hour later?
@Mike N,
The pilot switched off the transponder so secondary radar and TCAS would be inoperable and ATC and other aircraft would not know where he was and ADS-B tracking of MH370 by ATC officially and on apps like FlightAware or FlightRadar 24 unofficially would stop.
The pilot switched off the SATCOM, so passengers and crew could not communicate with the outside world by satellite phone, email or sms and ACARS position reporting would not be sent to Malaysian Airlines Operations every 30 minutes.
The pilot did not communicate via any of the five VHF and HF radios.
The pilot made his diversion from the flight plan look like an air turn-back to an airport in Malaysia.
The pilot only made his final major turn once he was outside of radar and ADS-B range.
The pilot only reactivated the SATCOM once he was sure all passengers and crew were incapacitated.
The pilot only reactivated the transponder, so he could use the TCAS to check for other traffic and the Weather Radar to check for bad weather on his intended route.
The fact that the co-pilot’s mobile phone was detected when MH370 was over Penang shows that the co-pilot was trying to communicate.
All this could be accomplished from the cockpit and there was no need to enter the Main Equipment Centre below the cockpit.
The pilot was taking a risk in flying without a transponder operating, but this risk was minimised by not following official flight routes and by flying at an interim flight level not assigned to other aircraft.
ATC would assign traffic heading West a flight level of typically FL280, FL300, FL320, FL340, FL360, FL380 or FL400 and traffic heading East a flight level of typically FL290, FL310, FL330, FL350, FL370, FL390 or FL410. You only have to choose an interim flight level such as FL345, FL355 or FL365 to avoid a collision with other aircraft.
The pilot was intent on preventing any communication, any position reporting and any detection by radar, transponder, ADS-B or another aircraft, whilst he hid the evidence of his nefarious act with MH370 ending up in a remote area of the Southern Indian Ocean.
Thank you so much for your patience answers my questions. Many of these matters, including which communications systems could be disabled directly from the cockpit (and how),are esoteric and even the pilot may not have been completely sure. So I can now see that cutting power to the SATCOM until passenger/crew were incapacitated would make sense (from the pilot’s perspective).
I think we share the same view as to who was responsible for this terrible tragedy, and I wish you well in the campaign to restart the search using WSPR data or indeed any other new information.
Very impressed with the work done on this, truly fascinating.
I find it difficult to understand why the person piloting would nose down crash the plane with maximum force. I realise it is difficult to understand why any of this would be done in the first place but that makes little sense to me.
if the objective was not to be found then surely it would have made sense to try and land the plane, then reset the flaperons, drop the gear, let it flood and sink.
could these parts not have broke off/apart as part of the effect of pressure at depth? if such and explosive impact why no suitcases? Why no bodies? Why not another flaperon?
@RJ,
Welcome to the blog and many thanks for the kind words!
The plane most likely entered the water nose first, as the WSPR data shows there was a significant forward horizontal speed and not just a significant downward vertical speed at the time of impact, the aircraft neither remained intact, nor shattered into a million pieces.
The person piloting did not nose down crash the plane with maximum force.
The evidence that the aircraft did not remain intact is that we have recovered 43 item of floating debris from both the interior and exterior of the aircraft along with a large amount of personal items of cabin luggage. A seat back video housing and a cabin divider are amongst the interior items found, including items with the Malaysian Airlines interior decorative coating design.
The evidence that the aircraft broke into a large number of pieces is that the average weight of the 43 items found is 4.8 kg. If the rest of the aircraft broke up into pieces of 4.8 kg on average, then there would be 174,369 kg (MH370 Zero Fuel Weight) / 4.8 kg = 36,300 pieces. This number is neither one (in other words intact), nor millions (in other words shattered).
You ask “why no suit cases?” Over 50 items of personal effects have been meticulously documented by Blaine Gibson:
https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/prrasha12xhrwtxcv7g1n/Blaine-Description-50-items-of-Personal-Effects-JUN2016.pdf?rlkey=n1v1qaco4k0xplf2ugkump0vb&dl=0
You ask “why no bodies?” Human remains will sink to the bottom of the ocean after a week or two. The extensive surface search by AMSA only started on 18th March 2014, 10 days after the crash and then only at 40°S. The AMSA surface search only moved northwards to around 30°S on 28th March 2014, 20 days after the crash.
You ask “why not another flaperon?” The right flaperon was found on 29th July 2015 on Reunion by Johny Begue. The outboard section of the trailing edge upper fixed panel forward of the left flaperon was found on 22nd May 2016 on Mozambique at Maçaneta Peninsular, Maputo Bay by a tourist. The outboard section of the trailing edge upper fixed panel forward of the right flaperon was found on 6th June 2016 on Riake Beach, Nosy Boraha Island, Madagascar by Blaine Gibson. Detailed analysis of all flaperon related items can be found in the Malaysian Safety Investigation Report items 1, 9 and 15 (1,423 pages, 52.5 MB):
https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/3cbisiylwj16nf9pfali6/Malaysian-MH370-Safety-Investigation-Report-Appendices-2018-07-30.pdf?rlkey=jtsdy8exrzlu1nd9jnw7nrm5o&dl=0
These parts were all floating debris that broke off either on impact or possibly before impact due to flutter damage. These parts did not break off due to the effect of water pressure at depth.