A former Qantas pilot, has set a new blind test for GDTAAA and the WSPRnet data. The departure was on 3rd June 2021 at 03:28 UTC (actually leaving the runway) at an approximate position of 13.830 °S 172.000 °W as this is not shown on ADS-B. The aircraft was an Airbus A330-200.
This report covers the first two hours of the flight from Samoa in detail and is available for download here. The flight was further tracked to Sydney where it overflew the airport and carried on towards Adelaide.
For the purpose of the blind test the important part of the flight has been covered, where there is no ADS-B data available. The reason that this flight was used is that there are no ADS-B stations on Samoa or in the surrounding region. The further flight tracking to Sydney and Adelaide was conducted without knowing that ADS-B data was available for that part of the flight.
Once this document was published, the former Qantas pilot revealed the actual flight path, the active flight plan and the times along the flight path. A comparison of the predicted flight path following the WSPRnet data and the actual flight path has been added to an updated version of the report and is available for download here.
@All,
Here is the actual flight information from Mike Glynn:
Flight History QF6036 3rd June 2021
1. The flight in question was a Qantas A330-200 VH-EBQ under the command of Capt. Tony Lucas from Faleolo Airport (NSFA) in Samoa, to Adelaide (YPAD) in Australia.
2. The aircraft was planned initially at FL380 with a climb mid-flight to FL400. The planned flight time was 7 hours and 49 minutes.
3. Flight routing was via R453 to the NN VOR in Fiji then A579 to Sydney, then H44 to MAXEM and Q60 to YPAD.
4. Actual routing was standard till over TESAT (Sydney airport) then direct tracking to position BLACK near Adelaide and arrival via position GULLY which is the initial point for the ILS RWY 23 in Adelaide.
The actual flight plan used by the crew is reproduced below. Some ETA’s have been completed separately when known.
FLIGHT INFORMATION
FLTNO REGO DATE
QFA6036 VH-EBQ 2021-06-03
DEPT DEST TOTALFUEL
NSFA YPAD 42.5
03:28Z 11:17Z
——————————————————————
NAV/LOG
WPT ETA ATA PREM AREM PFL AFL NOTE
NSFA 03:00 03:28 48.0 52.0 — —
APW 03:28 03:28 48.0 —– — —
UVUTI 03:36 —– 45.9 —– 147 — –
DAKAM 03:52 03:52 43.1 47.1 343 — –
TOC 03:59 —– 42.2 —– 380 — –
IDNIP 04:04 04:04 41.8 46.0 380 380 –
GOKIT 04:28 —– 39.4 —– 380 — –
GODAP 04:51 —– 37.1 —– 380 — –
GILUM 04:58 04:58 36.5 40.8 380 38 –
NN 05:06 05:06 35.7 40.0 380 380 –
TUTMU 05:12 05:12 35.1 39.5 380 380
TEPEK 05:21 05:21 34.3 38.7 380 380
TANIL 05:29 05:28 33.6 37.9 380 380
PUPEX 06:10 06:10 29.7 34.2 380 380
VIRAR 06:53 06:53 25.7 30.3 380 380
UBLIN 07:45 07:45 21.0 —– 380 —
NATLI 08:43 08:45 15.8 —– 400 —
ABARB 09:08 —– 13.7 —– 400 —
RIKNI 09:28 0926 12.1 —– 400 —
MARLN 09:32 —– 11.8 —– 400 —
TESAT 09:38 0938 11.3 400
KADOM 09:45 —– 10.7 —– 400
CWR 09:57 —– 9.8 —– 400
MAXEM 10:41 —– 6.2 —– 400
TOD 10:53 —– 5.3 —- 400
WOONA 10:56 —– 5.3 —– 330
BLACK 11:05 1104Z 5.1 1104z 151
PAD 11:15 1117Z 4.9 1117Z 015
@All,
Mike Glynn, Geoffrey Thomas and I have reviewed the results of the blind test which shows the GDTAAA system was able to detect the aircraft and track it within the accuracy limits of the WSPRnet data. Mike commented “I’m generally very heartened by how close the track you have derived is to the real thing.” Geoffrey commented this test “reconfirms that the technology works and works well.”
There was one error of note, the initial turn of the aircraft after departure was to port and not starboard. Mike commented “I should have told you that aircraft departing NSFA on RWY 08 will always turn to port due to terrain clearance considerations. If you’d known that then no doubt the first part of the route would have been a bit more accurate.” As I state in my report: “This underlines a weakness of GDTAAA in picking up an aircraft directly after take off as opposed to when an aircraft is established in the cruise.” In fact there was a very tight turn to port directly after take off, which is picked up by a WSPRnet anomaly marked in orange as shown in the link below. The actual position of the aircraft is marked with an asterisk in the linked GDTAAA output:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/s6lmyer3wvox5c4/GDTAAA%20V2%20Blind%20Test%2003JUN2021%200330%20UTC%20N%20SD%20Local%20View%20Actual%20Zoom.png?dl=0
GDTAAA managed to detect the aircraft despite this initial error and correctly tracked the aircraft along flight route R453 to Fiji and then the flight route A579 towards Sydney.
In my report I stated that there was no ADS-B data available in the public domain for the initial part of the flight. Although this is true for all cost-free ADS-B providers, I have been subsequently advised that the ADS-B data is available for the whole flight for gold account customers with FlightRadar24. For a blind test we have a strict rule that the ADS-B data must not be available in the public domain. As a result this test, although successful, will be followed up with a further test where the ADS-B data is guaranteed not to be found in the public domain. Qantas are kindly checking if there is a suitable candidate test flight without passengers and ADS-B record for aircraft delivery, positioning, maintenance or repair purposes. FlightRadar24 are checking whether there is a suitable candidate flight where they can supply Geoffrey Thomas with the ADS-B data privately and where the data is no longer available for download.
I will now start the test using the AMSA MH370 SAR data kindly provided by the RNZAF from their flight on 28th March 2014.
@Richard. Thanks for the trials update and its explanations; and to Mike Glynn.
Some comments and questions:
• About your take-off track you wrote, “….this underlines a weakness of GDTAAA in picking up an aircraft directly after take off as opposed to when an aircraft is established in the cruise.”
Indeed, had you been unaware of the need to reverse course after take- off, that might have complicated the trial even more.
To me, lack of alert that a false track is being followed remains an issue more generally. In this instance 8 indicators during that initial right turn and shortly after were deceiving, including the position indicators at 03:40 and 03:48.
Lessons gained from this trial might help but the further development that might yet might be offering could prove insufficient.
Constraining trials to just those that start from a stated in-flight position, course and time might be appropriate therefore.
However as it stands currently even that would not address the related possibility that unexpected arisings could go undetected in cruising flight, prejudicing confidence in the GDTAAA outcome.
• At the top of your page 23 you discuss lowering the SNR anomaly threshold to a 0.25 standard deviation. While that might increase progress and position anomalies, it might also reduce the prospects of spotting a false track?
• Your track turned onto R453 on reaching it. You explained on the top of your Page 12 that you assumed that would be the route. Had this track been clear of routes, presumably you would not have turned there?
• When did the timing of your tracked position become coincident with the actual please? Was it when first your track joined R453 at 03:58, the aircraft being on that already, or later? If so, before the 04:10 progress and 04:30 position indicators?
• There was a 42 minute gap between the 03:48 position indicator and that at 04:30, 32 mins of which were on the track. Had you not assumed he was on that, would that 42 minute gap have led you to abandon that track at that point?
• In your 30 August, 22:21, you note that the actual flight track was direct from TESAT (Sydney) to BLACK near Adelaide, in place of the flight plan’s H44 to MAXEM then to GULLY. While you halted GDTAAA tracking at Sydney, having a look at whether that would have been evident might add to experience?
@David,
I was aware of the need to reverse course after take off, I was not aware that the turn had to be to port for terrain avoidance reasons. That information would have prevented the initial error, where I turned to starboard.
As I clearly stated in my report, there were indicators for both a turn to port and a turn to starboard. Your choice of the word “deceiving” is misleading. There were adjacent position indicators at 03:40 UTC and 03:48 UTC which were on the actual track. It was simply not possible to detect and track from take off without the additional information that the initial turn when runway 08 is used is always to port.
This is irrelevant for the case of MH370 as we have the take off data. It will be interesting to see whether the diversion after waypoint IGARI can be detected and tracked in detail.
I disagree completely with your conclusion that “unexpected arisings could go undetected”. On the contrary, every turn and change of altitude shows up in the WSPR anomalies.
I plan to run a test to increase the SNR anomalies by additionally including a lower threshold of 0.25 SD. I agree with you that I expect this will increase the tracking accuracy and make it easier to spot a false track. I hope to try it out on the AMSA MH370 SAR flight by the RNZAF on 28MAR2014 as I have two minute flight data.
It is a fair assumption that a commercial aircraft would generally follow regional flight routes such as R453 or area flight routes such as A579. Sometimes an aircraft is given a direct routing as was the case to waypoint BLACK near Adelaide as you mention. The 04:30 UTC position indicator is right on R453 which is fairly conclusive that this flight route was followed.
There is no 42 minute gap between the position indicator at 03:48 UTC and 04:30 UTC. There are 11 progress indicators in this gap. I only abandon a track after 8 successive two minute estimated positions with no indicator at all (neither progress, nor position indicator).
I tracked the aircraft until 09:42 UTC, which is when I realised that it was heading direct for Adelaide.
@All,
Here is a link to a chart which compares the GDTAAA output with the ADS-B data and the Active Flight Plan position and times during the blind test:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/oe3nftmsiir7f1n/GDTAAA%20V2%20Blind%20Test%2003JUN2021%200328%20UTC%20to%200358%20UTC%20Regional%20View%20Actual.png?dl=0
@All,
An article by Geoffrey Thomas on this new technology has been published at AirlineRatings:
https://bit.ly/3jP9qPa
Geoffrey Thomas writes: “Tests adjudicated by AirlineRatings.com have involved a series of flights in the southern hemisphere where Mr. Godfrey had no access to the actual flight path or destination.”
WSPRnet signals are readily recorded to the other side of the world at distances over 20,000 km. Signals bounce between refracting back from the ionosphere and reflecting off the earth’s surface in multiple hops.
If the interim landing point is calm ocean or flat ice, then there is little loss in the signal during reflection. Hops can cover up to 4,000 km and with 10 hops you can circumnavigate the globe.
WSPRnet transmissions propagate further than previously assumed.
The WSPR protocol allows detections at lower signal levels than previously assumed.
Further tests are being run using MH370 search and rescue flights into the Indian Ocean in March/April 2014 but the new technology is proving useful to refine the flight path taken by MH370. Inmarsat data helps determine the MH370 flight path on an hourly basis into the southern Indian Ocean. GDTAAA and WSPRnet technology can help fill in some of the gaps with more frequent data points.
@All,
The report on this blind test has been updated with an additional section 7 titled “Comparison with Actual Flight Data”.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/so2dobpyz4uutzp/GDTAA%20V2%20Blind%20Test%20Flight%2007092021.pdf?dl=0
Richard,
Your re-issue of your report, including Section 7, has provided a timely opportunity to calmly review your report and comment after some contemplation.
Page 4: You write: “At 03:32 UTC there is a 0.5 standard deviation signal to noise ratio (SNR) anomaly marked in orange and 2 yellow WSPRnet links associated with the turn.” You cannot have your cake and eat it too. Yellow “stable” links are not “associated with the turn” in any way. They are STABLE WSPR links, neither anomalous nor affected by any external matters, including potential aircraft flight. Your definition of a “Stable” link is just that; it is a stable radio transmission and reception. In fact, the presence of a stable link MIGHT infer that an aircraft in the vicinity of the link path does NOT exist, but even then only IF the radio transmission actually bounced from the earth’s surface (land or sea) in the suspected vicinity of the suspected aircraft.
If, the reference to the stable links is because they have a signal to noise ratio standard deviation smaller than, but almost encroaching on 0.5, and are in your consideration of potentially being significant, as discussed at the top of Page 23 when you are discussing 04:44 UTC, then so be it, but you have not said so (written so), so the presence of the stable links cannot been inferred as “associated with the turn”.
Page 7 (first sentence of second paragraph): “At 03:44 UTC the aircraft is detected by a SNR anomaly marked in orange.” You cannot say that. All you can say is that at 03:44 UTC there is an SNR anomaly marked in orange, and that this anomaly may possibly have been caused by the presence of an aircraft. (or “the” aircraft if you wish).
This is a serious matter for which you must always be prepared for the simple question: “What makes you think that it was the suspected presence of an aircraft in this location which caused or contributed to the anomaly, and not some other cause.”
04:10 Page 14 – Why did you deviate from your previous estimated path.? You had been following virtually a straight line. Then at 04:10 UTC you decide to jump from that straight line to the where your red line “single SNR anomaly” crosses your cyan line flight route R453. Nowhere can I find your justification to deviate from your previous assumed, or estimated, path. In fact, had you continued on your previous estimated straight line path, then the crossing of your red line (the simple great circle between transmitter TX and receiver RX) would have actually been closer to your next-in-line “Test flight hypothetical position”. I can see no reason to make the diversion. We know that EITHER of the crossings may be indicative of the region of the aircraft position at the indicated time, indeed so might be the next-in-line hypothetical position estimated from your previous straight line path. Your propensity to allocate the crossing of an “anomalous” WSPR Link with a known flight route as being a “virtual” Position Indicator is a worry. Please rigorously explain your reasoning for using the crossing of the red line with the cyan line as a “virtual” Position Indicator, which is effectively what you have done.
Please Note that when and if attempting to track the flight of MH370 in March 2014, any tendency to find such “virtual” Position Indicators may undo any other positive attributes of that attempt.
04:40 Page 22 – Richard, this may be worth further investigation as to why the stable Short Path (thus why you have made it a thick yellow line) was not affected by the estimated or hypothetical aircraft flight path. Might be worthwhile to check whether (or not) the radio transmission could possibly have bounced from the earth’s surface (sea) in the suspected vicinity of the suspected aircraft.
05:02 Pages 28,29 – Please refer to the Global View on Page 29. Here you have shown a Position Indicator “lro” being the intersection of a “red SNR anomaly WSPRnet link” and an “orange SNR anomaly WSPRnet link” as described and shown on Page 28. Also shown is a yellow stable link which (virtually) passes through the junction of the red and orange links. For the red and orange links you have shown your estimates for the number of “hops” between Tx and Rx over the Short Path (each estimated as a single hop). You have also shown for both red and orange links your estimate for the number of Long Path hops from Tx to the intersection “lro”, and the number of subsequent hops from “lro” to Rx. For each red and orange the summation of the hops from Tx to “lro” and the hops from “lro” to Rx equates to ten. Questions arise, but firstly it needs to be recognised that the transmission path from Tx to “lro” and thence to Rx must be via the Long Path. So, first question is how many hops might you estimate for the yellow link from Tx to “lro” ? … Next… Might it be your opinion that the radio transmission from Tx across the Indian Ocean, across Africa, then the Atlantic and North America and finally across the Pacific would result in ever and ever larger hop lengths between bounces so that even if some of the radio waves actually did bounce at the location of “lro” the next hop would not land with a bounce at Rx (and hence be some of the transmission loss suffered by long path tranmissions).
It remains to ask how have you been estimating the number of hops for any of paths you have been analysing ? At “first glance” it is not obvious to me.
NOW TO TIMING:
The chart in Section 7 includes some timing comparisons.
To make it clear, I still do not know if the recorded time (Let’s call it the “TimeStamp”) for each WSPR record is the time at the start of the transmission or that at the end of the reception by the receiving radio station. I suspect it is the latter. BUT, perhaps it is actually at the START of the reception ?
Regardless, Consider the timing indications from the chart at Waypoint GILUM on Fiji. This provides a clear comparison. The Flight Plan aircraft position at 04:58 UTC was as shown by the white dot with green circular surround. This is where the aircraft was planned to be at 04:58 UTC as I understand the chart and data provided by Mike Glynn. Also on the chart is shown the recorded ADS-B position of the aircraft at 04:58 UTC.
Comparing actual (ADS-B) with planned, the aircraft was slightly over one minute behind schedule. This is estimated by using the GDTAA output points as being two minutes apart.
The corresponding GDTAA output with a TimeStamp of 04:58 UTC as indicated by the grey dot with green surround is four minutes away from the ADS-B data point. Using 425.5 knots as corresponding ground speed this is a nominal distance difference of 28 Nautical Miles.
Consider, IF, the TimeStamp is applied at the end of reception: Then during the actual reception over a time period close to two minutes the aircraft will have travelled approximately 13 Nautical Miles. The effect of any aircraft upon the transmission is PRIOR to the timestamp. If the aircraft crosses an imaginary line, then the recorded time it crossed that imaginary or hypothetical line will be AFTER crossing the line. At the time of the TimeStamp the aircraft will be at a physical point further along its flightpath than indicated by the timestamp. Compounding the above, the chart in Section 7 indicates that GDTAAA estimates the aircraft position to be nominally 28 NM AHEAD of the aircraft position as indicated by the ADS-B data point. Please, someone tell me I’m too tired and I’ve got this wrong.
@George
Many thanks for your lengthy comment and detailed consideration of my recent report. I have tried to answer your questions in a new post with an explanation of how GDTAAA and the WSPRnet propagation works using a worked example taken from the recent report.
Thanks Richard for testing out this new angle at cracking the case. While you have indicated that your blind test works on tracking a single flight, in theory, if the WSPR based tracking works, you should be able to extend this tracking all flights around the world.
To make a general purpose tracker, I suggest the following approach. Train a machine learning model to detect flight paths from WSPRnet data. Use historical flight path data(e.g. from flightradar24) and WSPRnet data to train the model. Carry out cross validation to ensure the model is predicting flight paths accurately.
Then, feed the model with WSPR data from 8 March 2014(the day it MH370 disappeared). It should in theory predict the flight path of MH370.
@Medad,
Welcome to the blog!
I mentioned in a comment on this blog dated 18th May 2021, which can be found on the post “When Do Whispers Shout”: “I have automated the process already quite extensively. I could imagine that an artificial intelligence program would be better at hunting for patterns than a human analysis but I have not got that far yet.”
GDTAAA is a general purpose tracker. GDTAAA stands for Global Detection and Tracking of Aircraft Anywhere Anytime. The WSPRnet data picks up any aircraft, whether commercial, private, military, … The WSPRnet data goes back to 2008 but these days there is a much larger volume of data and better global coverage.
I have always intended to implement the artificial intelligence approach using the historic data as you explain to train an AI software. At the moment, I am still at the stage of understanding the constraints and limitations of a WSPRnet based solution.
One flaw in your suggestion is that we do not know whether there was a human actor involved in determining the flight path of MH370 up until the last minute of the flight. The MH370 flight path was not similar to any previous flight paths captured on ADS-B data and available from providers such as FlightAware. There is no ADS-B coverage in the southern Indian Ocean and the Inmarsat satellite data is only every hour.
We do have the performance data for a Boeing 777-200ER from the manufacturer and we do have the engineering data for the particular aircraft registration 9M-MRO used on the MH370 flight on 7th/8th March 2014 from Malaysian Airlines. We also have the data found on the home flight simulator of Zaharie Shah. We could train the AI software with all this data. Unfortunately I am a team of one person without research funding for such an interesting endeavour, but I am open to offers.
Hi Richard, Re:One flaw in your suggestion is that we do not know whether there was a human actor involved in determining the flight path of MH370 up until the last minute of the flight.
One way to establish the extent to which human decision making and actions played a part in the flight path during the final hours of MH370/9MMRO after it left the Butterworth/Penang area might be to discuss this with “Captain Fourex”, aka “Captain XXXX” from MAS. His real name is redacted from the official investigation report.
On page 246 of the Safety Investigation Report of 2nd July 2018 it states that at 2120:16 UTC, 0520:16 MYT, about ten minutes after Singapore ATC, acting on behalf of Hong Kong ATC, had asked KL ATC for information about MH370:
“Capt. xxxx [name redacted] of MAS requested for information on MH370. He opined that based on known information, ‘MH370 never left Malaysian airspace’.”
In unravelling the multiple, convolluted narrative threads, it might also be helpful to clarify the point in the process where a decision was made, and by whom, to use the non-neutral word ‘opined’, rather than the more objective ‘said’, or ‘stated’.
Other useful potentia human ear-witnesses include the eight people from Marang who reported to police that they heard a very loud bang from the north east of Kapas Island at 0120:00 MYT. On searching the local beach they found no source for the sound.
If the source of the loud sound was, for example, sixty miles away, allowing for 5 seconds per mile for the sound to travel, it may be that there was a loud explosion or sonic pulse at 0115:00, somewhere close to MH370, that caused MH370’s satellitie guidance and communications sytems to become deactivated.
It is possible that, following the accidental or intentional incapacitation of critical guidance systems, unsuccesful attempts were made by the pilots to make an emergency landing initially at Sultan Ismail Petra Airport in Kota Baru, followed by Butterworth, Penang, Campbell Bay and Port Blair.
While this conjecture cannot confirm whether or not the plane was actively piloted by an on-board person right to the end, it might be helpul in piecing together a plausible, coherent preliminary narrative from the various fragments, facts and opinions that have been assembled so far.
Would a very loud explosion or sonic pulse, of the type produced by, for example, the airborne testing or deployment of a tactical nuclear weapon or other disruptive acoustic technology, cause its own distinct, traceable WSPR anomalies?
Did the Singapore Navy notice any unusual or unplanned explosions between 0100:00 and 0120:00 MYT within the area of the Singapore FIR that was managed by KL ATC for civilian aircraft purposes, and where MH370 was flying?
@TommyL,
At 05:20:16 MYT (17:20:16 UTC) the statement or opinion from the Captain was in the context of a number of FIRs along the planned flight path of MH370 stating that they had no information on MH370 and questioning where the aircraft was. We know that MH370 never checked in with Ho Chi Minh FIR, so formally speaking the aircraft was still in that part of the Singapore FIR managed by the Kuala Lumpur FIR.
At 01:00:00 MYT (17:00:00 UTC) according to the official ATC ADS-B data, MH370 was 116.6 km (63.0 nm) South-West of Marang on a bearing of 227.7°T. At 343 m/sec sound would take 5.7 mins to arrive in Marang.
At 01:11:00 MYT (17:11:00 UTC) MH370 was 67.7 km (36.6 nm) North-West of Marang on a bearing of 344.6°T and sound would take 3.3 mins to arrive in Marang.
At 01:20:00 MYT (17:20:00 UTC) MH370 was 187.7 km (101.3 nm) North of Marang on a bearing of 11.8°T and sound would take 9.1 mins to arrive in Marang.
Kapas Island is 6.8 km (3.7 nm) East of Marang on a bearing of 79.1°T. A loud bang coming from the North-East of Kapas Island and heard at Marang at 01:20:00 MYT does not fit with the trajectory of MH370, bearing from Marang and the timing of the loud bang.
I doubt that a short lived vapour cone associated with a sonic boom or the sonic pulse from a nuclear weapon test would be picked on the WSPRnet. I doubt that any such test would be performed just off the coast of Malaysia without the CTBTO sensors picking it up and a major public outcry ensuing.
Hi Richard,
I have came across multiple YT video and blog by Victor quoting the founder of WSPR here: https://mh370.radiantphysics.com/2021/12/19/wspr-cant-find-mh370/#comment-32816
How would you go on answering that?
@Marcus Will,
Welcome to the blog!
I am well aware of the vicious attacks and misinformation put out by a few misguided detractors in the internet and a few media outlets, against me and my collaborators. Generally I am ignoring such people, but since you ask …
We will write up all the science and technology in an upcoming paper. That is my prime focus at the moment. I am working on the technical paper together with the scientists, engineers and radio amateur WSPR experts: Dr. Robert Westphal (call sign DJ4FF), Dr. Karl Herrmann (call sign DL2NGT), Dr. Petrus Johannes Coetzee (call sign ZS6BZP) and Dominik Bugmann (call sign HB9CZF).
I published a WSPR Technical Overview 27 January 2022 at 13:55:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/454fh34g1483gcr/WSPR%20Technical%20Overview.pdf?dl=0
The WSPR information is publicly available. Please see
https://www.wsprnet.org/drupal/
and the download menu.
There have been a series of peer reviews, all positive. More reviewers are joining all the time. There are Professors and PhD students writing theses on WSPR being used to detect and track aircraft. We are still analysing the huge amount of data we have from the many tests that we have run. We are still devising further experiments to enhance our understanding of the WSPR science and technology in detecting and tracking aircraft. This all takes time and we do not expect to publish before mid March 2022.
Meanwhile there is a wealth of material for you to look at.
I have written 12 papers on WSPR and published them all on my website.
Dr. Robert Westphal has presented a paper at the world leading scientific conference in the radio amateur community HamSCI 2021 on the subject, which is also published on my website. He has submitted a further paper for HamSCI 2022. I have an archive of 64 academic papers on WSPR related science and technology, which I am willing to share with you. A literature review is planned as part of the upcoming paper. I have published a history of all WSPR related scientific discoveries from 1839 to the present day.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/6dykpaxrmi84t8d/History%20of%20WSPR%20Related%20Research.pdf?dl=0
There is a quote that is often attributed to Humboldt, around 1800 or so. The quote goes: “First they say you are wrong, then they say you are unimportant, then they try to give the credit to somebody else.”
Perhaps you can start by reading the following paper about WSPR and detecting aircraft by Rob Robinett et al.:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/kcivl2frg12nad7/Robinett%20et%20al%20Some%20Observations%20While%20Using%20the%20KiwiSDR%20to%20Spot%20WSPR%20Stations%202018.pdf?dl=0
Mike Exner and Victor Iannello fed Prof. Joe Taylor so many lies about me that he concluded “I have not read the papers on the Godfrey blog” and “I am not going to waste my time on them.”
I have watched videos of Joe Taylor presenting to amateur radio enthusiasts and have concluded, he appears a kindly, considerate and eminent 80 year old man.
Then I see how Mike Exner bated him with nice words, but leading the witness with “well meaning people” to use “historical WSPR data” that just “does not seem feasible” in the “middle of the Southern Indian Ocean” and “far from a WSPR transmitter or receiver”:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/tmxekrxr042p096/Mike%20Exner%2014MAY2021.jpg?dl=0
The spontaneous response from Joe Taylor was “This is nutty.”
https://www.dropbox.com/s/921jbn57uq32qr6/Joe%20Taylor%2014MAY2021.jpg?dl=0
Then the confirmation and further provocation of Mike Exner “totally nuts” and the apology for dragging Taylor into “this swamp”.
Followed by the real issue for Mike Exner “the media have picked up on this idea” quoting Geoffrey Thomas and ABC Australia.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/d7xb3udq9onuuxj/Mike%20Exner%2016MAY2021.jpg?dl=0
Followed up with the compliment “I’ve known Richard for 7 years. He has done some excellent modelling”
And then the damnation “he is completely off the rails regarding WSPR”
Joe Taylor then responds “I was not aware …” and “I have not read the papers on the Godfrey blog” and “I am not going to waste my time on them”
https://www.dropbox.com/s/htjuwcq125ku42p/Joe%20Taylor%2016MAY2021.jpg?dl=0
https://www.dropbox.com/s/xunc3npkn9l2dwb/Joe%20Taylor%2016May%202021%202.jpg?dl=0
In a court of law the Judge would ask was the witness led?
If a detractor is not willing to read my papers, how can he know what I am saying?
As an aviation nerd, technologist, and at-the-time advisor to the Malaysian government, I am absolutely in awe. If this pans out the way we hope, you will deserve all the honours and prizes coming your way.
You literally plucked this out of the air.
Do you have a theory as to why the lines diverge on the Qantas flight toward the end (between DAKEM, 0352Z and NSFA, 0328Z)?
@Luke Cohen,
Welcome to the blog and many thanks for the kind words.
The lines diverge at the start of the flight from NSFA towards waypoint DAKEM.
WSPRnet data requires an aircraft to be at a certain altitude and speed in order to be detected and clear of any obstacles like mountains that block radio waves.
In the absence of any detections of the aircraft at take off, I assumed a right turn rather than a left turn to pick up the later detections. I was unaware that only left turns are allowed for terrain avoidance reasons when taking off to the East at NSFA.
Yes that’s right, there’s a 600m elevation just to the right of the runway. Thank you for clarifying.