In addition to their existing other work, CAPTIO have studied a thousand Inmarsat compatible straight line trajectories crossing ARC2 from latitude 5.8°N down to 3.35°S. A straight line trajectory ( i.e. constant speed, great circle from Arc2 crossing point) minimises the number of trajectory variables to be considered. Based upon the geometry of the system (the aircraft and the satellites i.e. the actual one and the virtual one), we analysed the BFOR behaviour as function of speed, track direction, position and time. We also came up with an analytic formula for the Inmarsat compatible straight line trajectories crossing Arc2. All these numerous trajectories starting at latitude 5.8°N down to 3.35°S at Arc2 are equally probable and the resulting likely latitude at Arc7 is circa [~31°S;~39°S].
The paper can be downloaded here
@All
An interesting paper by CAPTIO considering a number of different start points at the 2nd Arc and examining the geometry of the resulting flight paths.
The analysis underlines how important it is to determine the actual flight route taken between the 1st Arc at 18:28:15 UTC and 2nd Arc at 19:41:03 UTC. If we can be sure of the position of MH370 at the 2nd Arc, it would make it much easier to determine the crash location within the range of 31°S to 39°S near the 7th Arc.
First of all, sounds like Captio might be getting a little more agnostic about their scenario. They say they are reducing focus on 3rd party hijackers, instead saying they do not know how it happened.
In their paper, believe Captio are pointing out, if we accept Inmarsat’s suggested BTO/BFO error bars, which are quite wide, then is it hard to differentiate best straight flight path. The same conclusion probably applies to active pilot flights.
Couple things, first of all, I am advocate of active pilot, so a passive straight path with no maneuvers from Arc2 is not my current favored flight anyways. Though I might accept semi-straight Arc2 to Arc5. There seems to be a maneuver resolving at Arc2.
Believe those of us proposing flight paths are assuming the (BFO) data is better, or can be transformed to be better (accounting for maneuvers and BFO drift) than the suggested Inmarsat error bar size. Otherwise I am not sure we can say anything.
Basically Captio are saying, no matter how we compute a passive, straight flight path, the end point is within 31-39 South, and that area has already been searched unsuccessfully.
However, Captio also released this end-flight scenario Powerpoint last month for the 7th anniversary:
http://mh370-captio.net/wp-content/uploads/MH370-anniversary-2021-corr-v3d.pdf
Basically Captio saying, if I understand, apparent fast ditch (4-main pieces of aircraft) , active pilot suggested.
If that is all true, which I tentatively agree with. then a glide beyond 25 nm of Arc7 is suggested, I would think. So the crash site could still be 31-39 South + some glide space.
@CAPTIO
Have you considered all possible navigation modes (LNAV, CTT, CTH, CMT, CMH)?
You discuss “straight” flight paths and “constant” flight paths and you talk about reverse engineering wind data. You use the terms “track” and “heading”, but it appears sometimes interchangeably. When you use the terms “track” and “heading”, do you mean in accordance with an aeronautical definition? You do not consider magnetic variation, but although the flight paths under CMT and CMH are “constant”, they are not “straight”, so I presume they are excluded from your analysis.
You do not mention using waypoints in any LNAV mode at all. A great circle or geodesic flight path has an initial bearing and a final bearing and the bearing constantly changes en-route and are also not “straight”, so I presume they are also excluded. A rhumb line is a path of constant bearing, so I presume this is what you mean by “straight”.
Not only do winds affect the flight path in various ways depending on the navigation mode, the air temperature affects the air speed and fuel consumption as well. In the UGIB paper you reference, we used a full weather model based on GDAS data for the solution space. We forward engineer the flight path accounting for wind speed and direction as well as air temperature and ∂SAT at various altitudes. We run a fuel model along side the navigation model, which gives the aircraft weight, fuel rate and Mach at each point in time. The navigation model then works out the True Air Speed and uses the wind data to calculate the Ground Speed. Finally the satellite model works out the BTO and BFO fit.
@Richard
The analysis was mainly geometrical. Using neutral words ☺ : an initial direction at Arc2 and the great circle path. Why ? Well, for the purpose of demonstrating the principle. The precision (or the tolerance) of the measures and models makes that all navigation modes lead to the same results more or less within +/-1°.
The study was a means for us to go deeper and find the origin of the trivial directions 0° and 180° coming from the geometry of the system via a better characterisation of the behaviour of the BFORs. Doing so we found a cooking recipe to find quickly the approximate trajectory satisfying the doublet [Direction at Arc2; latitude at Arc2].
We conclude that if the aircraft did not receive any input from Arc2 – i.e. non piloted – then its arrival falls within [~31°S;~39°S] which “confirms” the findings from other groups like the IG . ☺. (Another aspect was didactic in providing a detailed description of the geometry of the airborne compensation algorithm with its limits: it compensates perfectly in two directions ~90° and ~270°).
@Jean-Luc Marchand
You have certainly written an interesting paper with plenty of food for thought. That is why I was pleased that you agreed to publish your paper on my web site.
Whether there was an active pilot from the 2nd Arc onwards remains to be seen in my view.
The is a youtube video, https://youtu.be/S2XQkqbRNFY, of a presentation which identifies a plausible flight path from Waypoint Povus to Davis Station on Antarctica located at 68°34′36″S 77°58′03″E.
The flight path has an average ground speed of 468 knots and a heading of 187 degrees.
The LEP is near 43S and 88E well beyond the 7th ARC near the larger debris area identified by Satellite at 45S and 90E.
The presentation discounts the spiral dive theory as not supported by the BFO data and available range of the aircraft.
The presentation looks at the drift analysis and suggests that the the floating debris was split up by the wind and ocean currents, at the proposed LEP, with some of the debris moving northward, some of which has been recovered, and some debris moving south east into the Antarctic Circumpolar Current.
The theory in the presentation looks at the MH370 mystery from outside of the official narrative.
It may be prudent to break the 7th ARC paradigm and consider all of the possibilities including post 7th ARC scenarios to succeed.
@Troy
Welcome to the blog!
Many thanks for the YouTube video and your excellent presentation.
We know that MH370 was refuelled in Kuala Lumpur at 15:27 UTC and had 49,600 kg of fuel on board.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/6ekpkkajm8oma72/Fuel%20Docket%201527%20UTC.png?dl=0
This aligns with the ACARS message from MH370 received at 17:07:29 UTC which shows that the fuel remaining (TOTFW) was 43,800 kg at 17:06:43 UTC having reached a cruise altitude of 35,004 feet.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/ksbmabew5io3xif/ACARS%20170729%20UTC.png?dl=0
This is sufficient fuel to reach the 7th Arc at around 37°S 90°E depending on the route taken.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/5wjz1gjfm9y9av0/7th%20Arc%20and%20Fuel%20Arc.png?dl=0
I accept that the home flight simulator indicates a flight path towards McMurdo. I co-authored a paper with Victor Iannello on this subject which you will find in the Archive section of this web site under Flight Path Analysis dated 25th August 2016 – Possible Flight Path of MH370 towards McMurdo Station, Antarctica.
The maximum possible fuel range is until around 39.5°S, even taking the most direct route and the most fuel efficient flight path with maximum fuel savings.
The maximum possible fuel endurance is until 00:25 UTC on the same basis.
If the crash were further south at 43°S 88°E then there would have been debris turning up in Australia where a large number of the beaches were thoroughly searched.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/kvclcvshqzu0h2c/WA%20Beaches%2033.7%C2%B0S%20to%2035.7%C2%B0S%20BRAN2020.png?dl=0
I conclude your proposed crash site is not reachable with the fuel on board MH370 and not consistent with the drift analysis and the absence of debris finds in South Western Australia.
I agree with your comments and did consider the reference data offered in the preparation of the video presentation.
The route to Davis Station from POVUS waypoint is actually the most efficient route south that does not fly over Northern Sumatra while still meeting the timing requirements for the crossover points on the BTO generated ARC’s, using an MRC cruise profile with a cruise climb to maintain optimum altitude.
The fuel/range model does indeed provide a position near 39.5S 88.5E at FL400 if the aircraft were to continue in cruise south of the 7th ARC until fuel is exhausted. As you concluded this location is not far enough south to reach 43S 88E with either the spiral dive or the unpowered glide, end of flight (EOF), scenarios.
In the video presentation a different more traditional end of flight scenario is used where the aircraft transitions from cruise climb into the descent phase of the flight at the 7th ARC. This transition to the descent phase is supported by the Inmarsat data which shows a reduced measured BFO value at 00:19:29 UTC. The initial decent rate is higher and then the flight path stabilizes shortly after to a 50 to 1 descent profile at 800 feet per minute.
The engine thrust and fuel consumption during this descent phase are significantly reduced which provides the extra range and endurance resulting in the 43S 88E LEP location at approximately 01:00 UTC.
Note: It would be prudent to consider the spiral dive, unpowered glide and shallow powered decent profile as a possible EOF scenarios in any analysis.
Note: The measured BFO of -2 at 00:19:37 UTC, which many analysts have stated is the result of a extremely high descent rate, has not been included in this analysis on the recommendation of the Inmarsat paper “The Search for MH370” in which paragraph 5.3 states that this BFO value should be discounted due to the inaccuracy of log on information occurring after the first log on at 00:19:29 UTC.
One issue with the recovered debris from MH370 is that not enough of it has been found. There are three logical explanations for the this lack of recovered debris, one would be that the debris is still floating out in the ocean, another is that the debris sank at the LEP location or later somewhere else in the ocean and lastly that a portion of the debris did not remain in the Southern Indian Ocean and went southeast instead. Another issue is that the suspected debris identified by satellite located near 45S 90E has not been properly researched or explained.
The CSIRO ocean drift reports were used as a reference to verify if an area near 43S 88E was a plausible LEP location and determine if it was possible for floating debris to be split by the wind and current into a portion moving north and a portion moving south.
The CSIRO reports indicate that virtually 100% of the simulated debris originating north of 37S end up moving north do not pass through the southern debris area near 45S 90E. The CSIRO reports also show that the groups of simulated debris originating south of 40S are split by the wind and currents with a portion, of some of the groups, passing near 45S 90E then heading southward and another portion from the same group move north and arriving in the area of Reunion Island, Madagascar and Africa. The data in the CSIRO reports also indicate that the proportion of the split is determined by the latitude, with less of the debris moving north as the originating latitude position moves south. It is estimated that the proposed LEP position near 43S 88E would provide approximately a 25% north 75% south split of the floating debris.
The fact that MH370 debris was not found on mainland Australia is an interesting one. The following link is a CSIRO video of the simulated debris initial positions and movement in 2014. If you watch this video and stop it at the 10th of October it clearly shows that a portion of the simulated debris from all of the groups originating along the 7th ARC, arrive on the west coast of Australia.
http://www.marine.csiro.au/~griffin/MH370/br15_MH370_IOCC_tp3l1p2dp_arc7_4422/br15_MH370_IOCC_tp3l1p2dp_arc7_44222014.mp4
The fact that a portion of the simulated debris from all points along the 7th ARC arrive on the shores of Australia in the simulation, means that the although it may be “more Likely” for debris originating south of 39S when compared to north of 39S, as stated in the CSIRO report, this does not mean that it is an absolute that debris must arrive on the coast of western Australia from anywhere on the 7th ARC. The simulated debris that arrives on the coast of Australia is significantly less relevant to the analysis than the proof of a proportional split of the different groups of debris which is confirmed as they move in the video.
Note: The simulated debris south of 40S originate at longitudes further west than 88E along the 7th ARC. The timing of these simulated debris in reaching Reunion Island, Madagascar and Africa, depicted in the CSIRO video is delayed significantly in relation to the timing if they had originated further east.
The LEP near 43S 88E is the only location that can explain the suspected debris areas near 45S 90E and at 35S 90E and still support the location, timing and amount of debris that has been recovered on Reunion Island, Madagascar and Africa. The following link shows the simulated debris along the 7th ARC where it had drifted by the 18 of March 2014 along with the drift speed. The red squares on the bottom right represent the suspected debris area near 45S 90E. It is evident that none of the simulated debris is close to 45S 90E at this point in time which means that if the suspected debris near 45S 90E is from MH370, the LEP cannot be along the 7th ARC.
http://www.marine.csiro.au/~griffin/MH370/br15_MH370_IOCC_tp3l1p2d_arc7_4422/20140318.html
What this means is that there are at least two plausible LEP locations, the one that you are pursuing which locates the LEP near 34.5S, which at some point in that analysis must have determined that the suspected debris area at 45S 90E is not from MH370, and this analysis which locates the LEP near 43S 88E and which does include the suspected debris area near 45S 90E as being from MH370.
I mentioned in my previous post that in order to properly investigate the disappearance of MH370 it is necessary to question all of the data and if necessary discard existing paradigms and take care not to make assumptions regarding flight path, range, fuel consumption and EOF scenarios that only match a specific paradigm. This is only in this way that confidence can built into the process and to ensure nothing is omitted.
Troy I am actually in philosophical agreement with your YouTube end-flight scenario, and possible 300-nm distance from Arc7. However, I currently envision 180 South Magnetic heading, and 300 miles off Arc7 puts MH370 in Dordrecht Hole >20000-ft deep. Per my paper below on the sim studies, I believe the flight path was 180 S Magnetic, maybe not McMurdo.
When I was researching the route to Davis, the possible routes to 45S the 104E location identified in the simulator data and variations on them were specifically analyzed.
One of the reference documents I used was a book “Bayesian Methods in the Search for MH370” which is available in PDF at the following link.
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-10-0379-0
The conclusion of this book is the generation of a statistical model of the Last Estimated Position (LEP) of the aircraft to specify a search area.
Figure 11.3 on page 108 shows the most probable locations.
The flight to Davis Station passes within highest probability ring near 38S 88.7E. in the upper figure.
The conclusion in the book also states;
“The search zone is dependent on the surface area covered by expected descent scenarios from the time of the final satellite log-on attempt at 00:19. This has been defined by expert accident investigators at the ATSB. If the actual descent scenario was inconsistent with the distribution of possibilities considered then the search zone
may need to increase in area”.
The search zone identified in the book is based on the spiral dive end of flight scenario. Since I am using a difference end of flight scenario than the ATSB, I used the conclusions of the book to determine the 7th ARC cross over point and the proximity to the satellite identified debris area at 45S 90E to identify flight path to Davis Station.
I have used every effort to use multiple sources to validate the flight path to Davis Station and the 43S 88E LEP.
There are so many possible flight paths for MH370, as shown in the CAPTIO paper, and only a few that can be moved from the idea category to the plausible category.
Do you have other information which relate to the180S flight path in your paper that could make it more compelling.
With appropriate use of hedge words, I feel it is now almost obvious that MH370 was crashed into Broken Ridge, probably >25 nm from Arc7. 180 South Mag fits the sim data, BTO,BFO, and debris drift data (especially Prof Chari’s).
It sounds like you are assigning a lot of importance to the ATSB/DSTG orig Bayesian hot spot. However: assumptions were made: straight flight path with as few maneuvers as possible (ghost flight scenario), and turn south before 1840 were heavily favored. In those days, I was not a participant, but suffice it to say, I am in hindsight not a strong believer in those assumptions. I realize there remains support for that orig search area.
I am of the opinion, based on all of the data, that the analysis done by the ATSB in 2014-2015 was correct and the underwater search further south of the 7th ARC should have continued after the surface search and initial underwater search were completed.
One of the pieces of supporting data used by the ATSB is the analysis included in, Bayesian Methods in the search for MH370 by Samual Davey etal.
I am also of the opinion that the aircraft was piloted and flew a great circle route, once it turned southward, ending with the aircraft in a controlled decent and finally ditching.
Based on the determination that the aircraft was piloted and the range performance analysis included as Appendix 1.6E, Boeing Performance Analysis – Malaysian Airlines 777 9M-MRO Missing Occurrence -08, of the investigation final report, the location identified in the Bayesian analysis is used as a waypoint rather than the a search location.
I am also of the opinion that the pilot had detailed knowledge of all of the radar installations along the route including the Australian JORN Operational Radar and planned the flight so that it did not enter the Laverton Radar area, which had a published effective radius of 3000 km, in order to avoid detection on the final leg of the flight.
A great circle flight southward which avoided the Laverton Radar area would need to have a track of not less than 184.8 and not greater than 190 to respect the 7hz BFO error limit. These tracks are the most range efficient and can be operated at cruising speeds between LRC and MRC.
The track which passes over the most probable location identified in the Bayesian Methods analysis is 186.5 +/- .5 degree and can be operated as MRC cruise speeds providing the best range performance.
The information in Appendix 1.6E Table 4 indicates that aircraft range capability at MRC cruise speed is at least 2806 Nm from ARC 1 if the aircraft was un piloted and flew at a constant FL400 ft until fuel was exhausted.
Using the same information and converting it to a more conventional piloted flight incorporating step climbs from 33000 ft to 40000 ft and a descent phase the range capability is increased by approximately 230 nm placing the LEP for the aircraft near 43S and 88E along the 186.5 track.
This location is within a 10 to 14 day drift range to the possible debris site identified by satellites from 3 different countries near 45S and 90E.
In a document titled, Analysis of flight MH370 potential debris trajectories using ocean observations
and numerical model results by Joaquin A. Trinanes et al, figure 7 shows the trace of drifters from the Global Drifter Program and there is one drifter marked in a green line which passes near 43S 88E and arrives at Reunion island. It is also evident that a large portion of the other drifters that pass through the same area and continue to the south east near 45S 90E and continue to the southeast toward Macquarie island. One thing to note is that very few of the drifters actually arrive on the coast of mainland Australia.
In my opinion the 43S 88E LEP location is the only one that is supported by all of the data.
@Troy
We have the engineering data for 9M-MRO from a previous flight and therefore detailed knowledge of the fuel range and endurance. You will find the fuel model discussed at length in the UGIB paper which can be downloaded from the post titled MH370 Flight Path Analysis. The LEP location of 43S 88E is not reachable by 9M-MRO with the documented fuel load, even with all the possible fuel saving measures.
The Bayesian Methods in the Search for MH370 by Samuel Davey et al. assumes infinite fuel.
I did refer to the detailed fuel model description in the appendices of the UGIB paper posted under MH370 Flight Path Analysis as recommended. I created a new fuel model to emulate the data presented there and found that new model and the model that I have been using, with Boeing data, to be in close agreement.
I also want to positively recognize the authors of The Final Resting Place of MH370 (REF 1) for the level of detail and amount of work that went into producing that paper.
In REF 1, table 30 on page 38 the Fuel On Board (FOB) is identified as 34,139 Kg (75262 LB) at FL385 with a time of 18:29:00 UTC. On page 81 in Appendix A section 11 paragraph 15, the reduction in fuel flow related to operating the aircraft in cruise with the air conditioning packs turned off is calculated as 1.56% at 39000 ft.
In the Appendix 1.6E of the MH370 Safety Investigation Report (REF 2), table 3 on page 5 at the end of segment 5 the FOB is identified as 73908 Lb (33524 Kg) at FL 300 with a time of 18:27:43 UTC (.092 hours after the 18:22:12 last radar position). In Table 4 on page 6 the range capability is identified as 2806 Nm at FL400 with an MRC speed of 469 Knots and the aircraft is in normal configuration with the air conditioning packs operating.
Since the flight path to Davis Station from Povus waypoint is an MRC route at FL400, we can use the FOB of 34139 Kg from REF 1 and the range capability of 2806 Nm from REF 2 to determine the point of fuel exhaustion.
The range capability of 2806 Nm would be increased by the additional fuel on board 34139/33524 = 1.018, 1.8%, and by the effect of running with air conditioning packs off of 1.56% plus 10 Nm for the time difference between 18:29:00 and 18:27:43 at 469 knots.
The adjusted range capability would increase to 2911 Nm and if we add a nominal 140 Nm glide range after fuel exhaustion the total distance is 3051 Nm from 18:27:31 UTC.
The distance to 43S 88E along the flight path to Davis Station from 18:27:43 UTC is 3080 Nm.
I mention in my You Tube Video and in previous comments that it is more likely the aircraft started a controlled descent phase some time before fuel exhaustion in order to extend the range of the flight which could easily add the additional 27 Nm to the range capability including the negative effect of a strong headwind necessary to reach 43S 88E.
This simple analysis using data obtained from credible sources shows that an LEP of 43S 88E is possible and also shows that the location Identified in the book, Bayesian Methods in the Search for MH370 which lies just a few miles south of the 7th ARC at 38S 88.5E, is well within the range capability of the aircraft.
The difference in range expectations between the two routes is related to the 19:41 latitude, in REF 1 that latitude is 2.89 N. The more direct route south towards Davis Station has a 19:41 latitude of 2.2 S south a difference of more than 300 Nm.
@Troy
In the paper “The Final Resting Place of MH370” that you reference we define the the LEP as 34.2342°S 93.7875°E at 00:19:29 UTC.
You have redefined the LEP to include a nominal glide range of 140 nm continuing in the direction of Davis Station.
In the UGIB paper we define the position at your FMT time of 18:29:00 UTC as 7.1008°N 95.6844°E. The initial bearing to Davis Station is 186.59°T.
You calculate there is sufficient fuel at 18:29:00 UTC for 2,911 nm range.
The end point of a track starting at 7.1008°N 95.6844°E on a great circle initial bearing of 186.59°T and a distance of 2,911 nm is 41.2°S 89.1°E and not 43°S 88°E as you claim.
1. Do you think the FMT occurred before 18:29 UTC? Even before or during the 1st Arc logon? That is the only way you can get to 43°S 88°E by adding the 140 nm extra.
2. How do you know MH370 continued on a straight course at 00:19:29 UTC for 140 nm and did not spiral left or right as indicated by the Boeing end of flight simulations after fuel exhaustion?
3. How do think a glide of 140 nm is achievable with extremely strong head winds at 43S 88E?
4. How do you think a glide of 140 nm is achievable with the loss of control surfaces as indicated by the debris analysis by Mike Exner and Don Thompson?
1. I am of the opinion the aircraft started its turn southward as soon as possible after the 18:22:12 last radar position.
The first of two left turns occurred when the aircraft was just southeast of NILAM waypoint, onto airway P627 at or a few seconds before 18:25:27 UTC.
The second turn or “FMT” is accomplished at 18:35:00 UTC near POVUS waypoint and the aircraft transitions from P627 onto the great circle flight path between POVUS and Davis Station and is on that path at 18:39:58.
2. Since the aircraft did not run out of fuel until much later than 00:19:29, a spiral dive left of right would not have occurred at that point in time if it occurred at all.
More than likely the aircraft was in turbulence and responding to a downward vertical wind gust, which resulted in the lower than expected measured BFO of 182. Then as usual the aircraft recovered the lost altitude and continued on its way. Turbulence as we all know is a common occurrence on flights and although less “Hollywood” than a spiral dive, would be a much more consistent explanation for the lower BFO.
It is important to note that the BFO data only provides insight into the aircraft vertical movement as the doppler shift happens, which occurs in less than 1/1000th of a second, and should not be interpreted as anything more than that.
All we really can determine from the BFO measurement of 182 is that the aircraft may have moved downward around 0.8 inches during the time the data snapshot was taken.
To make any other determination more extreme than common turbulence can only be considered speculation.
3. When I did the more detailed calculations in preparation for the You Tube video presentation, I also included a fuel flow reduction due to the fact that the electrical system was almost completely shutdown for the early part of the flight from the initial diversion at 17:20:00 UTC until 18:25:27 and then only partially restored after that for the remainder of the flight.
Those calculations indicated that due to the addition fuel savings and from fuel remaining in the fuel supply piping the aircraft had at least 400 kg of burnable fuel remaining when it reached 41.2S 88.2E.
One of the end of flight scenarios I ran was to have the aircraft descend initially at MMO from FL400 to FL330 and then continue at 300 KIAS to sea level. Using the descent model data presented in appendix B.2.7 of the paper “The Final Resting Place of MH370” resulted in a descent range of 110.5 Nm in a time of 18.3 minutes with a fuel burn of 332 Kilos taking into account head winds of up to 58 Nm/h.
The position at 41.2S 88.2E as pointed out is short of the 43S 88E LEP location and in this case by 107 Nm.
With the additional 110 Nm from the descent the LEP at 43S 88E can be achieved.
This of confirms the LEP at 43S 88E is plausible.
4. I am appreciative of all of the work done by all of the analysts involved with MH370.
The debris analysis to which you refer is very good work and is done with the underlying assumption that the aircraft was involved in a high speed dive.
I have not found any evidence that a high speed dive actually occurred and do not consider a high speed dive as a reasonable end of flight scenario. The opposite is more likely since it is obvious that for some portion of the flight a pilot was in control of the aircraft so it is logical that the pilot remained in control eliminating the possibility of a high speed dive from occurring.
@Troy,
In my flight model I have analysed the BFO at 00:19:37 UTC considering all possible MH370 positions of latitude, longitude, altitude, speed and track, the Inmarsat satellite position (ECEF x, y, z) and velocity (ECEF ẋ ẏ ż), the aircraft doppler compensation, the uplink and downlink doppler, the EAFC and eclipse effect, the channel unit offset for CU10 and the smallest value for the rate of descent that fits the observed value of -2 Hz is 14,750 fpm.
In the Boeing end of flight simulations there are five cases where a spiral descent of greater than 15,000 fpm are recorded.
In the DSTG analysis by Ian Holland of the BFO at the end of flight the smallest value for the rate of descent is 14,800 fpm.
We have the SITA data log for the Inmarsat IOR and POR satellites for both the MH371 and MH370 flights. During the MH371 flight there are 3,346 BFO data values recorded between 134 Hz and 246 Hz. During the MH370 flight there are 459 BFO values recorded and all except one value are between 86 Hz and 273 Hz. The only time the Inmarsat satellite ground station records a BFO value outside these ranges is at 00:19:37 UTC where the value is – 2 Hz.
There is a long list of MH370 analysts including Duncan Steel, Mike Exner, Henrik Rydberg, Don Thompson, Curon Davies, Yap Fook Fah, Barry Martin, Bobby Ulich, Niels Tas, Geoff Hyman, Brian Anderson, etc who have all published rate of descent values at the end of flight of a similar order of magnitude.
This is not due to a miscalculation.
This is not due to “turbulence”.
This high speed dive is a “reasonable end of flight scenario”.
This is not “speculation”.
This is not “Holywood”.
This is careful analysis of the data by a large number of analysts.
I note you also continue to reject the debris analysis as evidence of a high speed dive.
I note you also continue to reject the satellite data unit reboot at 00:19:29 UTC as a result of a power outage due to fuel exhaustion.
What evidence do you have for an early FMT?
Your views about the MH370 end of flight are at odds with Boeing, ATSB, DSTG, Inmarsat and a long list of leading MH370 analysts. I think you should question your assumptions and calculations.
He was a talented pilot. In line with his superb skills, he very well performed a timed ditching that was interrupted by uncontrollable wave action. We must consider the human (pilot) psyche in all calculated senerios. This mystery was a thoroughly planned deliberately piloted event. I think ego (i.e. proudly displayed cunning) played a role in this disappearance. Mosal Tov